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The year 1943 marks the fourth year of war. The peace-time economy
of the United States has been profoundly altered by the impact of an
intensive defense program and of a more intensive war effort. In this
section we survey the major shifts of this period. The more compre-
hensive of the measurements available to-us relate to annual move-
ments, carrying through 1942.Theseare supplemented by monthly
records extending through the first part of 1943.
CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL PRODUCT
The measurement of changes in the over-all output of the economy
is difficult even in peace time under conditions of comparative sta-
bility. The task is vastly more difficult in the transition from peace to
war.7 We must recognize, therefore, that when we attempt to measure
the degree of increase in the national product between 1939 and 1942
we are dealing with rough approximations.
The value of the gross national product, broadly defined to include
all final products and services whether produced by private enterprise
or by government (services of the armed forces, for example, are
here included), increased approximately 71 per cent between 1939
and 1942 National income, or the value of the net national product
(which is the value of consumer goods and services plus net additions
to capital) increased some 69 per cent.8 As measures of output these
aggregates suffer from the fact that they are expressed in dollar terms,
and so are affected by fluctuating prices and alterations in wage and
salary rates. Accurate correction for these changes is impossible, but
we may modify the value measurements by taking rough account of
advances in the unit prices at which goods and services are sold. Such
This problem is discussed, by. Simon Kuznets in a paper, Measuring National Product
in War-Time, to appear in this series.
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Gross and net national income are not crystal-clear concepts.There are important
and debatable questions as to the items that should be included in these aggregates.
Thus governmental operations financed by business taxes are included in gross national
product, as estimated by the Department of Commerce.There is reason to question
this procedure, on the ground that it involves double counting.This item amounted to
some $10 billion in 1939, well over $20 billion in 1942.
8
Cyields estimates of 35 per cent as the increase between 1939
and1942 in gross national product, and 33 per cent as the increase in
net national product, both in terms of volume.9
This estimate of the increase from 1939to1942inreal gross na-
tional product differs rather materiall.y from that of the Department
of Commerce.1° In the Commerce estimates use is made of an implicit
deflating index that shows a price rise of only 14 per cent between
1939and1942. Gross national product, thus deflated, increased 50
percent during this period. In the light of other evidence the Com-
merce deflator appears to understate the actual rise in the prices of
goods and services entering into the national product." Understate-
ment in the deflator would lead to overstatement by the derived
measure of increase in real gross national product. I believe that the
O correction of national income estimates by a price index gives a crude approx-
imation to actual changes in volume of goods produced and services rendered.In the
present case the is an average of index numbers of average hourly earnings
for employees in nonagricultural industries, wholesale commodity prices, and retail food
prices, with weights of 2, 2 and 1. This average shows an increase of 27 per cent from
1939 to 1942 (average hourly earnings increased 24 per cent, wholesale prices 28 per
cent and retail food prices 30 per cent).
On the commodity price side the deflator almost certainly understates the actual
price rise.The index of average hourly earnings, on the other hand, may overstate the
average change in rates of compensation for services in the economy at large. We have
some relevant information in Department of Commerce estimates of the annual average
compensation per employee of workers in nonagricultural industries (Survey of Current
Business, March 1943, p. 17).The figures relate to averages in which salaries and
wages are combined.Percentage changes from 1939 to 1942 are given herewith. These
All nonagricultural industries +29
All nonagricultural industries, excluding government +37
advances in average compensation reflect the influence of longer hours of work as well
as higher rates of pay.The figure, 24 per cent, used in the deflating index is one
estimate of the increase in average rate of pay.
In an independent estimate of the iniluence of price factors on the values of net
national product and gross national product, Simon Kuznets derives deflating index
numbers almost identical with that here employed.Mr. Kuznets' index of price
changes affecting national income shows a price advance of 27.9 per cent from 1939 to
1942; the index relating to gross national product shows a price advance of 26.8 per
cent. These figures will be published in Mr. Kuznets' forthcoming paper, Measuring
National Product in War-Time.
10 National Income and National Product in 1942, by Milton Gilbert and George Jaszi,
Survey of Current Business, March 1943, p. 11.
Director's Note: I think that Department of Commerce figures for national income in
1942 are too high, in comparison with estimates for earlier years. This results from the
shifting of many persons from tasks not paid for in money (e.g., the work of house-
wives) to employment paid for in dollars. Failure of the Department of Commerce to
take account of this shift, in its estimates of national product, is in my judgment
unfortunate. OSWAW W. KNAUTH
9Commerce estimate of a 50percent gain in the volume of national
product between 1939 and 1942 does overstate the true gain. If the
actual increase approximates 35percent, as here estimated, the ac-
complishment was a very substantial one indeed.
The attempt to measure physical production directly runs into diffi-
culties of its own. The available data are limited. There is no common
denominator by which the physical output of 1942 may be accurately
compared with that of 1939. We may, however, estimate the physical
output on the basis of employment, productivity, and actual physical
count of units produced in certain basic industries, and from value
series corrected for the estimated influence of price changes. The in-
crease from 1939 to 1942 was, of course, uneven. Changes in major
elements are shown in Table 2.
These measurements are for diverse and overlapping elements of
the economy. The output of primary products increased more than 20
per cent. The output of bas.ic power was up 51 per cent, reflecting the
heavy demands of industry. As we pass to manufacturing we find an
accelerating scale of production, reflecting the more intensive fabrica-
tion required in many of the war industries as well as the utilization
of existing stocks of materials and scrap. Manufacturing output was
76 per cent greater, with durable goods (up 129 per cent) leading.
The aggregate of ton-miles and passenger-miles of railroad traffic
was 69 per cent greater in 1942 than in 1939. The gain for new con-
struction of all sorts was slightly greater (87 per cent) but this aver-
age hides diverse movements. Most impressive is the gain (from a
low 1939 base) in new industrial construction financed by public
agencies. In 1942 this was 213 times the 1939 volume. The additions
to plant capacity represented by this figure promise further advances
in industrial output in 1943, as effort shifts from plant construction
to manufacturing. Consumer goods and services shared in the general
advance, but the gain was moderate. Here there was pressure to re-




Wholesale prices, goods intended for use in capital equipment +10
Cost of living +17
Construction costs + 21
Farm prices +71
Average hourly earnings, mfg. labor +35
Composite wage rates (Federal Reserve Bank of N. Y.) +24
Weighted average of hourly earnings, nonagricultural industries +24
Prices of goods sold in department stores +25
10TABLE 2




Livestock and livestock products 100 122
Raw minerals2 100 122
Sales of electric power to ultimate consumers 100 151
(kw.-hr.)8
Manufactured goods2 100 176
Durable goods 100 229
Nondurable goods 100 131
New construction4 100 187
Transportation5 100 169
Consumer goods and services6 100 113
1 Source: American Economy in 1942, C. A. R. Wardwell and R. B. Bangs, Survey of
Current Business, Jan. 1943.
2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.See footnote 15 for a qualification
concerning these indexes.The qualification applies particularly to the measurements
for durable goods. The reader should note that no adjustments for seasonal movements
have been made in these production figures. For most industrial series it is hazardous
to assume that pre-war seasonal patterns have persisted through 1943.
3 Edison Electric Institute.
U. S. Department of Commerce estimate of construction activity (Survey of Current
Business) deflated by American Appraisal Company index of construction costs.
U. S. Department of Commerce.
6U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, March 1943, p. 14. The
measure here given relates to consumer expenditures expressed in 1939 dollars.
strict output and sales. Between 1941 and 1942 there was, indeed, a
slight drop in the volume of consumer goods and services sold.
The composition of the stream of industrial products turned out in
1942 was different from that of earlier years. A classification of the
elements of the Federal Reserve index reveals certain of these
changes. The percentages for 1942, it will be recalled, relate to a





Durablemanufactured goods - 38 52
Nondurable manufactured goods 47 37
Raw minerals 15 11
Federal Reserve estimates place at 55 per cent the portion of total
output devoted to the purposes of war in 1942. This was higher for
durable manufactures (73 per cent) and for minerals (55percent)
than for nondurable manufactures (29 per cent) •12
12 See American Economy in 1942, C. A. R. Wardwell and R. E. Bangs, Survey of Cur-
rent Business, Jan. 1943, p. 10.
11The general picture is one of extraordinary advance in the physical
output of our economy. Nineteen thirty nine was by no means a de-
pressed year in American industry. It was a year of revival after a
short, severe recession. But within three years the over-all volume of
goods produced and services rendered had increased more than one-
third over the 1939 level. This was a more substantial accomplish-
ment than the increase of approximately 25 per cent achieved between
1914 and 1917.13
In this striking advance in the physical output of our economy we
drew on those resources of human power and technical potentialities
that had been only partly tapped during the years immediately pre-
ceding the war. From a figure close to 9 million in 1939 the number
of unemployed persons fell to about one million in March 1943.
(The latter figure is taken to be close to an irreducible minimum,
representing a mobile reserve of. labor.) The number of employees
in nonagricultural establishments increased from an estimated 29.8
million in 1939 to about 38.2 million in March 1943. We augmented
our labor supply, also, by lengthening the work week. A manufactur-
ing work week that averaged 38.1 hours in August 1939 was in-
creased to an average of 44.7 in March 1943. Total man-hours worked
in manufacturing plants increased from approximately 15 billion in
1939 to 26 billion in 1942, or 73.3 per cent.'4
18 The production index for 19 14-17 is from Economic Tendencies in the United States
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1932, P. 188).It relates to the production
of both raw and processed goods.
I should point Out that the difference between the productive records of the two
war periods is due, in good part, to differences in the non-industrial sector of the
economy.There was againof 20 per cent in the output of agricultural products be-
tween 1939 and 1942, as compared with a gain of only 2 per cent from 1914 to 1917.
The superiority of the recent gain has been much less pronounced in industrial produc-
tion. A detailed comparison of production in the two periods will appear in a forth-
coming paper in this series, Industrial Production in World Wars I and II, by Geoffrey
Moore.Mr. studies indicate that the production of industrial materials in-
creased 35 per cent from 1939 to 1942, 32 per cent from 1914 to 1917.These figures
are based, of course, upon that portion of industrial production that is open to meas-
urement. They do not include elaborate finished instruments of war or highly fabricated
goods of peace.It is probable that in the recent, period the shift to products of elab-
orate design has been more pronounced than in the earlier war.If this is true, the
record of the later period would be more favorable than these percentages indicate.
14 This estimate is derived as follows:
The Census of Manufactures gives 7,886,567 as the average number of employees in
manufacturing establishments in the United States in 1939.Between 1939 and 1942
the number of employees in the sample of manufacturing plants reporting to the Bureau
of Labor Statistics increased 52.3 per cent.Applying this percentage to the Census com-
pilation for 1939 we have 12,011,242 as the estimated number of manufacturing em-
12The technical improvements of this period, which added to the
substantial productivity gains of the preceding decade, cannot be
listed at this time, nor can we measure, except in the roughest way,
their effects on the over-all productivity of labor. In manufacturing
establishments there were conflicting movements, with declining out-
put per man-hour in some industries, considerable advances in others.
The net change seems to have been slightly upward between 1939
and1942, but because of changes in the character of production and
the absence of detailed output figures for certain finished goods no
accurate measures of productivity changes can be derived. If we have
held to the 1939 level of man-hour output in the face of a 73 per cent
increase in total man-hours worked, the accomplishment has been a
noteworthy one indeed. The record of over-all output shows that
the powers of industrial production that were, in large part, only
potential in 1939 were utilized in 1942 in a drive for production that
far exceeded anything attempted before in our history. That drive
was successful.'5
ployees in 1942. The average length of the work-week increased from 37.7 hours in
1939 to 42.9 hours in 1942.Multiplying the average number of employees in each of
the two years 1939 and 1942 by the average length of the working week, and multiply-
ing this product by 50 (the estimated number of weeks worked per year by manufac-
turing workers, on the average) we have the man-hour totals given in the text.These
may understate the over-all gain, for employed factory workers almost certainly worked
more weeks on the average in 1942 than in 1939.
15 We must recognize that production indexes covering a period marked by wide
shifts in the character of goods produced are less accurate than indexes covering mote
stable times. The difficulties are far more serious, of course, for manufactured products
than for primary products.The measurements of manufacturing output cited above,
issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, rest in part on esti-
mates of productivity changes, for a direct count of physical output under the war
program is not available.The attempt to build: up a continuing series on man-hour
output, covering the activities of peace and of war, faces serious conceptual and prac-
tical difficulties.It involves equating the products of peace with those of war.But
what common system of physical measurement is applicable to automobiles, refrigerators,
vacuum cleaners, and to tanks, planes, explosive shells and the varied equipment of
war? When a factory passes from the making of juke boxes to the production of fuses,
or from the making of passenger cars to the production of airplane parts, how can we
judge whether productivity per man-hour has increased or decreased?If we resort to
the gauge of money values as a bridge from the output of peace to the output of war
we are on very uncertain ground indeed, particularly in a period of rapidly changing
values and of government bidding that, in its early stages, must subordinate price to
more pressing considerations.
The production figures for primary products and for manufactured goods involve
an apparent inconsistency, since the increase in output of finished manufactures so
greatly exceeds the gain in raw material production.This is not an impossible relation-
ship, however.If the degree of fabrication undergone by raw materials in 1942, in the
making of planes, tanks, ships, fire control equipment, and all the other instruments of
1.3MONTHLY RECORDS OF PRODUCTION CHANGES
When production is increasing rapidly, annual figures measure the
movement with a considerable lag. The record of economic expansion
during the war is brought closer to date by monthly index numbers
(Table 3). These are less comprehensive, of course, than the over-all
statistics on gross national product.
For durable manufactured goods, the category of primary impor-
tance in the present effort, the output in March 194316 was threefold
the average of the twelve months preceding September 1939. The
other entries in the table show smaller gains, as they did in the com-
parisons in Table 2.Theonly notable difference between relative
standings in the two tables is provided by new construction contracts
which fell off sharply after July 1942.Thepeak of our needs for new
modern warfare, was substantially greater than the degree of fabrication of basic mate-
rials in the making of automobiles, bedsprings, refrigerators and other peace-time goods,
production indexes would stand in just such a relationship. Itis perhaps true that
manufacture for war involves, on the average, more refined operations than does manu-
facture for peace, but the margin of difference between the production indexes for
primary products and manufactured goods may not be entirely accounted for on this
ground.Other factors contributing to this margin are the using up of stock piles of
materials, the decline in exports of materials, and the acquisition of important supplies
of new scrap metal not recorded with primary production.Furthermore, the indexes
of primary production exclude some materials used by manufacturing plants, notably
certain chemicals.
These various factors would contribute to an increase in manufacturing output
exceeding that recorded by current indexes of primary production. They would perhaps
not account for the observed difference (see Table 2).It is not unlikly that the index
of manufacturing output overstates the actual gain of the period 1939-42.In the
transition from peace to war, from established production techniques to the trials and
errors of a new production job, man-hour productivity could decline, initially.In its
handling of certain production series the Federal Reserve Board makes the assumption
of a steadily advancing man-hour productivity, in which we start war work from a
productivity level achieved over years in perfecting techniques of peace-time produc-
tion.The assumption is open to question.(The matter is discussed by Moore in the
forthcoming paper, Industrial Production in World Wars I and II.)
One offsetting consideration must be stressed, however.Once the transition has
been effected, and the initial experimental stage completed, opportunities for great pro-
ductivity gains are opened. We know something of what has been accomplished as
assembly line methods and other mass production techniques have been applied in turn-
ing out tanks, ships and airplanes. Although man-hour productivity may drop in the
first stages of transition to war, it may increase substantially as factories swing into full
war production. Later, as labor supply difficulties develop and problems of maintenance
become acute under a speeded-up program, efficiency and productivity may fall off.
16Throughoutthis paper attention is centered on the situation in March 1943,the
month set as standard in the President's 'hold-the-line' order of April. 8. Later monthly
figures are given in many of the tables, but the discussion in the text deals in the main
with March relations.
14equipment was then passed, and efforts could be concentrated on the
production of final products.
TABLE 3
Monthly Changes in Production and Transportation, 1939-1943
Sept. 1938-March June
Aug. 1939 1943 1943
Rawminerals' 100 124 121
Sales of electric power to ultimate consumers (kw.-hr.)2100 176 181
Manufactured goods' 100 212 217
Durable goods 100 308 316
Nondurable goods 100 138 141
Construction, contracts awarded3 100 91 60
Revenue freight, in ton-miles4 100 237
1Indexnumbers of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
2 Edison Electric Institute.
Value of construction contracts awarded, Federal Reserve index, deflated by index of
construction costs, American Appraisal Company.
InterstateCommerce Commission. Latest available figure is May 1943.
The preceding statements relate to physical output. Aggregate
values were increasing more rapidly than volume of output during
these years, for unit prices were rising for all types of economic goods.
These advances in values reflected a general upward movement of
unit prices. The rise was not of a runaway character, but in its scope
and amplitude it was clearly inflationary. We turn now to a survey of
this price rise.
CHANGES IN PRICES,
Five periods, which are set off in the two sections of Table 4, may be
distinguished in following the record of price changes since 1939.
They include an initial period of 18 months, 13 months from Feb-
ruary 1941 -to March 1942 (the month of the first general fixing of
prices under the General Maximum Price Regulation), six months to
September 1942 (the month set as standard in the President's Stabili-
zation Decree of October 1942), six months between September 1942,
and March 1943 (the month set as standard in the President's thold-
the-line' order of April 8, 1943), and a final period of three months
to June 1943. The index numbers in section A of Table 4 show the
cumulative changes over these several periods. More illuminating for
the present purpose are the entries in section B (Chart 2), in which
17 Remarks in footnote 15 concerning the difficulties faced in measuring production
movements in the transition from peace to war apply with equal force to price indexes.
Such measurements lose in accuracy when the character of production is being rapidly
changed.Special difficulties are faced in treating the area of government purchases.
Price measurements for primary products retain their accuracy, but all other indexes
for 1939-43 ace to be looked upon as approximations.
15TABLE 4
Price Movements in Various Markets, 19 39-1943
























2 This series, compiled by Fairchild Publications,consists of 105 non-style items
(excluding foods) of 49 retail trade organizations.
Compiled by the American Appraisal Company.
4 Per capita earnings derived from employment and payroll data of manufacturing
industries as published by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Hourly earnings of
manufacturing industries compiled by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The base
for both series is Jan.-Aug. 1939.
Prices received by farmers computed by the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
6 A monthly rate is here derived by dividing the percentage change between two dates
by the number of months in the period.
the movements during the different periods are put in comparable
terms—average monthly rates of change.
The first period, to February 1941, was marked by mixed move-
ments. On a unit basis, farm prices rose most rapidly, with hourly
earnings next, and wholesale prices third. Per capita earnings of
manufacturing labor actually increased more rapidly than any other
series, but this increase reflects longer hours as well as higher wage
rates. These relatively moderate movements gave way to a great
upward surge during the thirteen months from February 1941 to
March 1942. All elements of the price system were affected, even the
tardiest (construction costs) rising at a rate of almost 1 per cent a
16
Wholesale prices'
Cost of living, industrial workers'
Retail prices of goods sold in department scores2
Construction costs8
Per capita earnings, mfg. labor'






















Aug. 1939- Feb. 1941- Mar. 1942-
Feb. 1941 Mar. 1942Sep. 1942
(18 ma.)(13 mo.)(6 ma.)
Wholesale prices' +0.4 +1.6 +0.3
Cost of living. industriaL
workers' +0.1 +1.0 +0.5
Retail prices of goods sold
in department stores2 +0.3 +1.6 +0.1
Construction costs3 +0.3 +0.9 +0.6
Per capita earnings,
mfg. labor' +1.0 +2.1 +1.7
Hourly earnings, mfg.labor'+0.5 +1.4 +1.7
Farm prices5 +0.9 +3.2 +1.9
1 The index of wholesale prices and thecost of living







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tmonth. Retail prices in department stores rose as rapidly as whole-
sale prices. Farm prices leaped upward at a rate exceeding 3 per cent a
month; wholesale prices, retail prices, and hourly earnings of manu-
facturing labor rose at rates close to 1.5percent a month. The ad-
vance of wholesale prices was checked somewhat during this period
by control of the prices of certain materials strategically placed in the
war effort. But the underlying push of rising costs and newly released
purchasing power was far too great to be stemmed by the limited
efforts possible under a system of selective control.
In April 1942 the Office of Price Administration was empowered,
under the General Maximum Price Regulation, to hold retail and
wholesale prices at the levels of March 1942. The powers of the Price
Administrator were limited. Farm prices were almost completely free
from control; wages and salaries were exempt; rent controls were of
restricted scope. Between March and September 1942, the flood of
rising values was not stopped, but in important areas the rates of
advance were substantially retarded. Farm prices continued to rise,
at a rate averaging almost 2 per cent a month; hourly earnings of
manufacturing labor advanced 1.7 per cent a month, a rate exceeding
that of the preceding period. The advance in living costs was cut to
0.5 per cent a month, and the advance in wholesale prices to 0.3 per
cent. This last was a substantial accomplishment, in the face of the
serious limitations on the power of the Administrator.'8
The effects of the Presi4ent's general stabilization decree of Octo-
ber 1942 are to be read in the entries for the period September 1942-
March 1943. This decree did not stop the rise, nor is it clear that the
general advance was retarded in any substantial degree. Wholesale
prices rose at a rate of 0.6 per cent a month, as against a rate of 0.3
per cent during the preceding six months. Living costs advanced 0.7
per cent a month, a rate higher than that of the preceding period.
Farm prices advanced 2.0 per cent a month, fractionally above the 1.9
per cent of the six months preceding. In the field of wages greater
success was achieved. The rate of advance in average hourly earnings
in manufacturing industries was reduced from 1.7 to 0.8 per cent a
month. (Because of a lengthening of the work week, per capita earn-
ings continued to advance at the earlier rate.) It is clear that the gen-
eral stabilization order of October 1942 reduced the upward pressure
18Undercoveradvances did occur, however; the actual rate of increase undoubtedly
exceeded the figurederivedfrom the quoted prices.For examples of price advances
that eluded direct measurement see Melville J. Ulmer, Hidden Price Increases, Monthly
LaborReview, Nov. 1942,pp.903-12.
18of wages and cut the rate of advance in construction costs but failed
to retard increases in farm prices, wholesale prices, and living costs.
RATES OF CHANGE AMONG WHOLESALE PRICES, 1939-1943
The movements of various elements of the system of wholesale prices
during the last three and one-half years are traced in Table 5. Mixed
movements in the first period, with net increases for nearly all groups,
were followed by sharp advances along the whole front between
February 1941 and March 1942. The movements of the next twelve
months, following the General Maximum Price Regulation, are of
greatest interest. Between March 1942 and September 1942 farm
products and foods were the only groups to advance materially (raw
materials as a group rose in price because of the influence of farm
products). The front was held for all other classes of goods, at
wholesale. During the six months to March 1943 the record was much
the same. Farm products rose by 2.3 per cent a month; foods trailed,
but continued to advance at a good pace. With two exceptions
(chemicals and drugs and the miscellaneous group) prices of other
classes of goods were fairly well held in check.
TABLE 5
MonthlyRates of Change in Commodity Prices, 1939-1943
Classes of Commodities, at Wholesale
PBRIOD TOTAL
1 2 3 4 5 CHANGE
Aug. 1939- Feb. Mar. 1942- Sep. 1942- Mar. Sept. 1938-
Feb. 1941 Mar. 1942Sep. 1942Mar. June 1943 Aug. 1939 to
(18 mo.)(13 mo.)(6 mo.) (6 mo.)(3 mo.)June 1943
Wholesale prices (BLS) +0.4 +1.6 +0.3 +0.6 +0.1 +36
Raw materials +0.6 +2.5 +0.7 +1.6 +0.7 +64
Semimfd. goods +0.5 +1.0 +0.1 +0.02 —0.1 +24
Mfd. goods +0.3 +1.3 +0.2 +0.2 —0.1 +25
Farm products +0.8 +3.6 +0.8 +2.3 +0.9 +92
All ocher than farm products+0.3 +1.3 +0.3 +0.2 —0.1 +25
All other than farm products
& foods +0.3 +1.0 +0.05 +0.2 +0.1 +20
Farm products +0.8 +3.6 +0.8 +2.3 +0.9 +92
Foods +0.5 +2.4 +1.1 +0.8 +0.7 +54
Hides & leather products +0.5 +1.1 +0.2 —0.05 0 +28
Textiles +0.7 +2.0 +0.1 +0.03 +0.03 +46
Fuel & light —0.04 +0.6 +0.3 +0.3 +0.3 +10
Metals +0.3 +0.5 0 0 0 +10
Building materials +0.6 +0.9 —0.02 0 +0.1 +24
Chemicals & drugs +0.3 +1.8 —0.2 +0.7 0 +32
House furnishings +0.2 +1.2 —0.02 +0.02 +0.1 +20
Miscellaneous +0.3 +1.3 —0.2 +0.5 +0.1 +25
The system of wholesale prices moved upward as a whole, though
with some important differences in rates, between August 1939 and
March 1942. During the twelve months to March 1943 inflation in
this area was a highly selective process. Farm products and foods con-
19
Dtinued to advance in price; all other commodities inched upward, but
with individual exceptions stabilization was approximated as of
March 1942.Itis to be noted, however, that the inching process was
being accelerated in the half year from September 1942toMarch
1943.Advancingfarm prices and wage rates were exerting an influ-
ence beyond their immediate groups. These movements called forth
the more drastic order issued by the President in April 1943.
RATESOF PRICE CHANGE AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF PRODUCTION AND
DISTRIBUTION, 1939-1943
For certain classes of goods we have price quotations relating to dif-
ferent stages in the movement from primary production to final con-
sumption. Comparability is not perfect, but the tracing of relative
movements at these stages is illuminating. This is done for foods in,
Table 6.19
TABLE 6




1 2 3 4 5 Sept. 1938-
Aug. 1939- Feb. 1941- Mar. 1942- Sep. 7942- Mar. 1943- Aug. 1939
Feb. 1941 Mar. 7942Sep. 1942 Mar. 1943June 1943 to
(18 mo.)(13 mo.)(6 mo.)(6 mo.)(3 mo.)June 1943
A Food products, general
At the farm +1.3+2.7+1.7+2.8+0.9+103
At wholesale (raw) +0.8+3.1+1.1+2.2+0.9+88
At wholesale (proc.) +0.5+1.9+0.5+0.6 —0.2+38
At retail (raw and proc.)+0.3+1.6+1.1+1.4+1.1+49
BFruits and vegetables
At the farm +1.8+1.0+4.2+7-3+6.7+202
At wholesale +0.1 +3-7±1.9±3.1±8.1±135
At retail +0.2+2.2+0.8+4.5+4.6+101
C Meat animals and meats
Meat animals at the farm+1.6+3.1+1.4+2.0 —1.1+90
Livestock at wholesale +1.4+2.9+1.2.+1.8 —1.7+72
Meatsatwholesale +0.7+2.4+1.0 —0.1 —1.1+39
Meatsat retail +0.4+1.4+1.4+0.8+0.2+42
D Cotton and cotton goods
Raw cotton at the farm —0.2+6.6+0.5+1.2+0.1+129
Raw cotton at wholesale+0.6+7.2 —1.2+2.3 —0.1+132
Print cloth at wholesale+1.1+4.1+0.4 0 0 +104
Cotton goods at wholesale+1.0+3.5+0.02—0.02 0 +75
In the first period the price rise in foods was sharper at the farm than
in other markets. The rate of price rise at the farm exceeded the rates
19Thereader should note that no seasonal corrections have been made in the measure-
ments in this table.
20of advance in other markets in all periods, with one exception. Raw
foods at wholesale moved upward most rapidly in the second period,
which was marked by a general upsurge in all markets. In the third
period, that following the General Maximum Price Regulation, rates
of advance in food prices in all markets were retarded, sharply
tarded for processed food products at wholesale. The period of six
months following the October stabilization edict withessed higher
rates of increase for food products at the farm and at wholesale, un-
changing rates at retail.
Such a table does not show where the pressures toward higher
prices originate. The intensity of movement, however, shows a decline
as products pass from the farm through wholesale markets to retail
markets. This is customary in periods of price advance, but the
present spread between the rise at the farm and at retail is unusually
great.
The section of the table dealing with fruits and vegetables shows
the same general relations. Here there is some retardation of price
advances in wholesale and retail markets in the third period, under
the General Maximum Price Regulation; in the fourth period ad-
vances were accelerated in all markets. A few fruits and vegetables
were brought under control in this period but in the main prices in
this area were left free to rise.
The records for meat animals and meats reflect the same failure to
check prices at the livestock stage, and show an accelerated rise in
livestock prices as we pass from the third period to stabilization
under the Presidential edict. The prices of meats at wholesale were
definitely restricted in the fourth period, but retail meats continued to
advance, though at a slightly lower rate. The effect of control at the
meat stage, without corresponding restrictions, at the livestock stage
was, of course, to narrow the processing and marketing margin, with
consequent disturbance of the flow of meats to market.
A final example of a related sequence of changes is provided by
cotton and cotton goods. During the first period prices of cotton and
cotton goods in wholesale markets advanced, but farm prices sagged.
The general acceleration that came early in 1941 carried all cotton
prices up, at very rapid rates, the rise being sharpest for raw cotton at
wholesale, least rapid for cotton fabrics, in wholesale markets. The
General Maximum Price Regulation brought abrupt checks or price
declines at all stages here represented. In period 4 the freeze contin-
ued to be effective for cotton fabrics, but raw cotton prices in whole-
21sale markets and at the farm advanced. The result was a narrowing
of unit fabricational margins.
The significance of price changes is imperfectly realized if we look
at prices alone. Prices are intimately related to the volume of goods
entering into exchange. For individual commodities this is obviously
true in the interplay of unit prices and quantities offered and pur-
chased. It is equally true when we are concerned with more general
aspects of production and trade—with aggregate production, with
the stream of goods in transit, with total amount of employment.
For it is as aggregate values, in dollars, that these physical totals
enter into many of our commercial accounts, our banking records, our
national gross product and national income accountings. When unit
prices are altered the value record of exchange transactions and the
underlying facts of physical volume do not tally. The essence of
inflation is divergence of corresponding value and volume aggre-
gates: records of the values of goods and services entering into ex-
change exaggerate increases (or understate declines) in the physical
volume of goods and services exchanged; the essence of deflation is
divergence of the opposite type: value records exaggerate declines in
physical volume (or understate advances). We turn now to a survey
of the changes of the last four years with special reference to infla-
tionary divergences between value and volume aggregates.
THE INCIDENCE OF PRICE INFLATION,
The impact of changing prices on certain elements of the economic
system is graphically portrayed in Chart 3. Corresponding measure-
ments are given in Table 7. The first five entries relate to the pro-
20Inflationand deflation are economy-wide conditions.Rising prices and values for
one class of goods are riot inflationary if these advances are offset by declines among
other, classes of goods. Thus the volume and value aggregates that diverge(i.e.,
change at unequal rates) under inflationary or deflationary pressure are aggregates com-
prehending all goods and services entering into exchange.Transactions involving exist-
ing wealth in the form of land or capital, as well as those involving newly produced
goods, are included in these aggregates.Measurements relating to portions of this
total will, of course, reflect the influence of special conditions as well as the play of
inflationary or deflationary forces of wider incidence.The observations cited in the
text in tracing the incidence of inflation relate, of necessity, to special areas of the
economy.
In defining inflation as a divergence between volume and value aggregates in a
given economy, with value rising more rapidly than volume, we recognize as inflationary
a divergence resulting from declining productivity.Such a decline could mean higher
costs per unit, higher prices per unit, and a decline in volume not paralleled by a
decline in aggregate value or in aggregate disbursements to income recipients.
Pigou defines inflation as the condition that existswhen money income is expand-
22TABLE 7
Quantity, Price, and Value Changes in Major Elements
of the Economy, 1939-1943
PERCENTAGE CHANGE




Agricultural production1 +20 +71 +1052
Mineral production +17 +14 +332
Manufacturing production +96 +25 +1452
Construction, contracts awarded5 +24 +17
Revenue freight, in ton-miles +120 +116
Retail sales +28 +45
Consumer expenditures +24 +42
Mfg. production and payrolls +96 +204
Mfg. employment and payrolls +99 +204
MEg. production and profits of mfg. corporations6 ±94 _74 ±81
Shares traded on N. Y. Stock Exchange7 +57 +1 +598
1 For this series the changes are measured from the annual average for 1939 to the
annual average for 1942.
2 Aggregate value is average unit price multiplied by the quantity measurement.
3 In deriving the quantity index, aggregate value is divided by the price factor.
4 Average unit price is derived by dividing aggregate value by the quantity factor.
Awards of construction contracts had by March 1943 declined substantially from their
peak, which came in July 1942.
6 These figures relate to 1939 and the first quarter of 1943.Profits of the first quarter
are expressed at an annual rate.See Table 18 and accompanying text for a fuller
statement on corporate profits.
7 quantity index relates to all shares sold on the N. Y. Stock Exchange. The price
index is the N. Y. Stock Exchange average for all shares sold.The derived value
index is the product of the price and quantity measures. The actual value figure is that
reported by the N. Y. Stock Exchange.For an explanation of the difference between
the two see footnote 23 and Table 14, footnote 7.
8 Derived. Actual.
ing more than in proportion to income earning activity" (Economic Journal, Dec. 1941,
p. 439). He calls attention to the bearing of productivity changes on this relationship,
but prefers to treat as non-inflationary (or non-deflationary) non-proportionate changes
in income and in output that are due to changes in productivity.
I believe it well to treat as inflationary a decline in physical volume not paralleled
by a corresponding decline in aggregate disbursements to income recipients, whether
this condition results from a drop in productivity or from other causes, and as deflation-
ary a rise in physical volume not paralleled by a corresponding increase in aggregate
disbursements to income recipients, whether this condition results from an advance in
productivity or from other causes.Such a deflationary movement might be socially
desirable; the term is here used without normative implications.It is to be recognized,
of course, that productivity changes would not necessarily lead to divergence between
value and volume aggregates.Such divergence would occur only when selling prices
(and corresponding disbursements to agents of production) were not altered commen-
23CHART 3





*lndex numbers represent 1942.
suratelywith an advance or a decline in productive technique.
The evil effects of inflation are attributable in good part to the dispersion that
accompanies rapid change in average prices. But such dispersion of prices is a concomi-
tant of inflation, not the essence of it.
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Per centduction, transportation, and valuation of physical goods. In all cases,
except in ton-miles of freight, value increases materially exceeded
the increases in physical output. The difference was most pronounced
for agricultural products, least for ton-miles of revenue freight.
These differential value gains do not correspond to physical accom-
plishments; they are due to advancing unit prices. Viewed collectively,
they reflect the play of inflationary forces.
The movement of goods and the rendering of services in the final
stages of distribution to consumers may be measured, physically, only
by indirection. The entries in Table 7 for retail sales and consumer
expenditures must be regarded as estimates. Retail sales in March
1943 were, in volume, some 13 per cent greater than the monthly
average for 1939; in value they were 45 per cent greater. Volumes
were inflated by an average rise of some 28 per cent in unit price.
Aggregate consumer expenditures, as estimated by the Department of
Commerce, were 42 per cent greater in March 1943 than the monthly
average fOr 1939. The physical equivalent of this advance in expen—
ditures was an advance of some 15 per cent in 'quantity' of goods and
services received. The 'inflationary differential' at the stage of final
purchase by consumers thus amounted to some 24 per cent—the
increase from 1939 to March 1943 in the average price of goods and
services bought by consumers.21
The next set of entries in the table and chart relate to changes in
physical volume of production and corresponding disbursements of
wages. With the rise of 96 per cent in manufacturing production
went an advance of 204 per cent in manufacturing payrolls. Wage
disbursements per unit of goods produced increased some 55per
cent between 1939 and March 1943. Since such a measure may be
21Therise is that shown by the index of living costs for urban workers.This index,
like the index of wholesale prices, is subject to a wider margin of possible error in
war-time than it is in peace-time.Up-grading, undercover price advances, and quality
changes that are not reflected in quoted prices combine to complicate the task of the
maker of index numbers.In their net effect such changes may introduce a downward
bias, causing the index to understate the inflationary differential and the derived index
of physical consumption to exaggerate the true increase.But such biases axe difficult to
define with precision.
Director's Note: I think the average degree of deterioration of consumer goods since
1939maybe pretty accurately estimated at between 15 and 20 per cent. Scarcely any
article today does not show some small degree of deterioration, while in some lines
it is clearly around 30 per cent. This estimate is not made as a statistical measurement,
but as a personal observation based on numerous judgments and inquiries. In my
opinion it is better to use a rough estimate of deterioration than to ignore this im-
portant change. W. KNAUTH
25distorted by short-term variations this rise may be followed more
accurately on an annual basis. From 1939to1942 total manufactur-
ing output increased 76 per cent; total manufacturing payrolls 142
per cent. These indexes differ somewhat in coverage, but on the
assumption that each is generally representative of manufacturing
industries, an advance of 38 per cent in wage payments per unit of
goods produced is indicated.22 As a measure of changing labor costs
this should be taken as a rough index only. The character of our in-
dustrial production changed so greatly from 1939 to 1942 that all
measures of production, productivity, and labor cost lose some of
their precision. But as indicators of the general direction and char-
acter of economic movements they have value.
A somewhat different aspect of changing values, with reference
to disbursement, is revealed when we compare total manufacturing
employment, measured in man-hours, with total payrolls. Against a
rise of 99 per cent in aggregate man-hours worked in manufacturing
industries we have an advance of 204 per cent in the total value of
this labor, i.e., in total wage disbursements. Disbursement per man-
hour of labor time (average hourly earnings in manufacturing) in-
creased 53 per cent. Here is another area in which aggregate values
rose much more rapidly than the corresponding physical entities.
Production and profits (after taxes) increased substantially for
manufacturing corporafions between 1939 and the first quarter of
1943, but the advance in profits fell somewhat behind the increase in
output. Unit value (profits per unit of product), as shown in Table
7, declined an estimated 7 per cent.
To complete the picture we trace changes in the sales and unit
values of equities. The final estimates in the table relate to such
changes. Between 1939 and March 1943 the total number of shares
traded on the New York Stock Exchange advanced 57 per cent. The
average price of all shares listed on that Exchange increased 1 per
cent.23 Prices advanced in the first half of 1943, but to date inflation-
22 Advances in labor costs per unit appeared to be greater in the heavy industries than
in the light, but changes in the character of goods produced render the measurements
less accurate for the heavy industries.The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has pub-
lished measures of change in unit labor costs for selected manufacturing industries,
mainly light industries.The median advance from. 1939 to 1942 in labor costs per
unit among 19 major groups is 18 per cent.(See Productivity of Unit Labor Cost in
Selected Manufacturing Industries 1939-42, Monthly Labor Review, May 1943, p. 885.)
23 A measure of percentage change in the aggregate value of shares traded that is con-
sistent with the quantity and unit price measurements is not consistent with the value
26ary forces have not been strong in the markets for common and pre-
ferred stocks.
Chart 3, giving a general perspective of changes in quantities and
aggregate values in different economic areas, portrays graphically
the incidence of inflation. The uneven character of the physical ad-
vances and the still more uneven impact of inflationary forces on the
elements of the economy are clear.
TABLE 8
Farm Pro ducts
Changes in Quantities Produced, Average Unit Prices,
and in Aggregate Values, 1939-1942
1939 1942
Farmproducts quantity 100 120
price 100 171
value 100 205
Grains (food) quantity 100 137
price 100 165
value 100 226
Cotton and cotton seed quantity 100 112
price 100 212
value 100 237
Truck crops quantity 100 120
price 100 190
value 100 228
Fruits quantity 100 103
price 100 162
value 100 167
Meat animals quantity 100 128
price 100 172
value 100 220
Poultry and products quantity 100 119
(chickens and eggs) price 100 161
* value 100 192
Dairy products quantity 100 114
price 100 146
value 100 166
Production measurements relate to physical quantities produced for sale and farm
consumption. Price index numbers are computed from prices at the farm. Both series
rest on computations of the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Indexes of aggre.
gate value are derived from quantities and unit prices.
Further details of the volume and value changes between 1939
and 1942 are set forth in the accompanying tables and charts. Among
farm products (Table 8 and Chart 4) the gains in physical output
were greatest for grains and meat animals; the volume-value differ-
figure reported by the Stock Exchange.The latter shows a gain of 4 per cent between
1939 and March 1943.Changes in the composition of the total(i.e., an increasing
proportion of low-priced stocks) account for the difference.
27entials due to price changes were greatest among cotton and cotton
seed, truck crops, and meat animals. But the differentials were large
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250for all classes of farm products. Raw minerals (Table 9, Chart 5)
experienced relatively small price advances; the value aggregates ex-
ceeded the physical volume totals by only narrow margins. For iron
ore, indeed, average unit prices declined, and the value changes.were
smaller than the volume changes.
TABLE 9
Mining
Changes in Quantities Produced, Average Unit Prices,
and in Aggregate Values, 1939-1943
MarchJune
1939 1942 1943 1943
Rawminerals quantity 100 122 117 114
price 100 111 114 115
value 100 135 133 131
Bituminouscoal quantity 100 146 163 104
price 100 113 118 119
value 100 165 192 124
Anthracite coal quantity 100 116 127 72
price 100 113 118 118
value 100 131 150 85
Petroleum, crude quantity 100 109 113 114
price 100 116 116 118
value 100 126 131 135
lron ore shipments quantity 100 204 321
price 1O0 90 90
value 100 184 289
Quantity measurements are derived from production indexes computed by the Board
of Governors, Federal Reserve System. No seasonal adjustments have been made. Price
indexes (computed by the National Bureau of Economic Research) relate to wholesale
markets. Indexes of aggregate value are derived from quantities and unit prices.
Among manufacturing industries (Table 10 and Chart 6) there is
a wide range of variation in both physical output and the volume-
value differentials. Durable goods advanced most rapidly in volume
of output. (This class includes certain industries not represented
among the detailed entries for individual industries.) The prices of
the materials going into such goods were held down, however, and
the inflationary differentials were in general smaller than among non-
durable goods. Among individual industries the price gains were
greatest for manufactured farm products, wood pulp and lumber.
At the distributional stage physical volume advances were substan-
tial, while price increases were large enough to inflate these to still
higher value levels. March 1943 marked the end of a period auring
which there was much discussion of abstention from consumption,
but in which actual reductions were modest. With reference to 1939,
indeed, gains were registered widely among consumption goods (see
Table 11). The figures in Table 11 relate solely to retail distribution.
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*lndex numbers represent 1942.
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In 1942 total retail sales were in volume some 12 per cent greater
than in 1939, in value 34 per cent greater. Price advances were the
chief factor in the greater value change. Food and apparel sales and
prices reveal notable shifts in the status of consumers. For each of
these classes dollar expenditures were roughly 50 per cent again as
high in 1942 as in 1939.Butthese higher dollar expenditures bought
only 25 per cent more clothing, only 15 per cent more food.
The entries for March 1943 mark a further stage in the advance of
prices. The value of all food sales was substantially greater than the
monthly average for 1942, but the quantities were identical. The
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100 176 196 201
100 124 125 125
100 218 245 251
100 229 272 278
100 114 114 114
100 261 310 317
100 131 133 136
100 130 133 132
100 170 1.77 180
100 175 184 176
100 103 103 103
100 180 190 181
100 163 167 169
100 110 110 110
100 179 184 186
100 119 100 116
100 142 144 146
100 169 144 169
100. 132 135 134
100 120 120 121
100 158 162 162
100 150 111 119
100 103 103 103
100 154 114 123
100 45 42 50
100 100 100 100
100 45 42 50
100 155 151 145
100 167 168 168
100 259 254 244
100 135 141 143
100 105 105 105
100 142 148 150
100 144 151 148
100 138 141 141
100 199 213 209
100 120 111 102
100 116 116 116
100 139 129 118
100 113 110 108
100 123 123 123
100 139 135 133
100 103 118 107
100 124 136 135
100 128 160 144
100 132 110 194
100 144 163 158
100 190 179 307
TABLE 10
Manufacturing
Changes in Quantities Produced, Average Unit Prices,
and in Aggregate Values, 1939.4943
All manufactured goods quantity
price
value
Durable mfd. goods quantity
price
value
Nondurable mfd. goods quantity
price
value





































Meatpacking quantity 100 132 125 138
price 100 145 150 145
value 100 191 188 200
Cigarettes quantity 100 136 135 142
price 100 105 109 109
value 100 143 147 155
Tobacco and snuff quantity 100 94 89 80
price 100 100 100 100
value 100 94 89 80
Paper, pulp quantity 100 148 129
price 100 170 170 170
value 100 252 219 228
Paper products quantity 100 122 122 121*
price 100 116 118 120
value 100 142 144 145
Newsprint quantity 100 104 102 102
price 100 100 108 108
value 100 104 110 110
Petroleum refining, total quantity 100 104 99 105
price 100 118 121 124
value 100 123 120 130
Gasoline quantity 100 98 88 95
price 100 103 106 108
value 100 101 93 103
Fueloil quantity 100 118 126 127
price 100 124, 132 135
value 100 146 166 171
Lubricating oil quantity 100 110 106 109
price 100 153 133 135
value 100 168 141 147
Kerosene quantity 100 99 109 108
price 100 130 141 146
value 100 129 154 158
Coke quantity 100 156 161 150
price 100 116 116 116
value 100 181 187 174
Measurementsof changes in aggregate value in this table are derived from indexes
of changes in physical quantities 'produced or consumed and in average unit prices. The
quantity indexes are those of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (with a
few additional series in handling specific commodities). No seasonal adjustments have
been made. Price indexes are those of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics or of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Forfull accuracy in the value measurements, quantity and price components of each
value index should include precisely the same commodities. This condition is met in
mostof the smaller groups covered in this table. For the larger groups,. especially the
durableand nondurable categories, the quantity andprice indexes differ rather widely
incoverage. They are here combined on the assumption that eachquantityand price
index is broadly representative of commodities in the group in question. The derived
value measurement indicates the direction and magnitude of changes in a value aggregate,
but is no more than a rough index of actual movements.
available figure is May 1943.
33TABLE 11
Distribution




Total retail sales quantity 100 112 113 114
price 100 120 128 131
value 100 134 145 149
Apparel stores quantity 100 125 136 155
price 100 124 127 127
value 100 155 173 197
Food stores quantity 100 115 115 107
price 100 130 144 149
value 100 149 166 160
Household furnishing stores quantity 100 112 108 111
price 100 121 123 124
value 100 135 133 138
Department store sales quantity 100 110 106 110
price 100 125 126 126
value 100 138 134 138
The estimates ofchanges in physical volume of department store sales and of other
retailsales were derivedfrom index numbers of the aggregate value of such sales and
corresponding indexes of unit prices. In some cases price and value measurements are
not as fully comparable as might be wished, but the derived figures may be taken as
reasonable approximations to the actual quantity changes.
For department store sales, value indexes are those of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and price indexes are those of the Fairchild Publications. The
value index numbers for retail sales are compiled by the U. S. Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce; price indexes are the cost of living indexes of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (excluding rents) and appropriate sub-group measures.
money for the same quantities of goods. The advances from 1939 to
March 1943 show very wide differentials between quantities and
values. For foods a rise of 44 per cent in average unit price converts
a 15 per cent advance in physical quantities into a 66 per cent rise in
aggregate value. A volume increase of 13 per cent in total retail sales
becomes a 45 per cent rise in value. Movements of this sort are, of
course, the essence of inflation.
The several preceding tables have dealt with changes in the physi-
cal volume of output and with corresponding price and value changes.
In certain fields of production activity we may trace the incidence of
inflation in other terms. We may measure the physical volume of
input, in terms of man-hours of work done, and compare changes in
this factor with corresponding price and value changes. The
such cases, is a measure of average hourly earnings, and the tvalue'
series relates to aggregate wage disbursements.
In manufacturing industries the differentials between volume of
employment measured in man-hours and corresponding total wage
34disbursements are wide (Table 12 and Chart 7). For all manufactur-
ing industries employment increased 99 per cent between 1939and
March 1943. The corresponding increase in value, measured by ag-
gregate payrolls, was 204 per cent. The rise in average unit
(i.e., in average hourly earnings) was 53 per cent.
Employment and payroll changes vary widely among industries.
These variations correspond in general to the physical production
differences previously noted. Variation in the measures of increase
in hourly earnings is smaller, but not inconsiderable. These measures
extend from 13percent for printing and publishing to 56percent
for industries manufacturing transportation equipment other than
automobiles. For all durable goods industries the increase amounted
TABLE 12
Manufacturing Industries
Changes in Employment, Hourly Earnings and Wages




per week) earnings payrolls
All manufacturing industries +99 +53 +204
Durable goods +174 +321
Nondurable goods +39 +37 +91
Iron and steel +116 +38 +198
Electrical machinery +226 +39 +35k
Machinery, excluding electrical +195 +42 +3 1.8
Automobiles +108 +37 +184
Transportation equipment, excluding autos +1,558 +56 +2,483
Nonferrous metals and products +114 +46 +212
Lumber and basic timber products +24 +44 +79
Furniture and finished lumber products +26 +39 +75
Stone, clay and glass products
. +37 +33 +82
Textile mill products +26 +82
Apparel and other finished textile products +29 +38 +78
Leather and products +14 +39 +58
Food and kindred products +16 +30 +.51
Tobacco manufactures +12 +28 +43
Paper arid allied products +32 +31 +73
Printing and publishing +13 +22
Chemicals and allied products +190 +41 +310
Petroleum and coal products +35 +24 +67
Rubber products +88 +31 +146
Measures of changes in employment and payrolls are from compilations of the
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.The percentage changes in average hourly earnings are
derived from these.Similar percentages computed directly from Bureau of Labor
Statistics measures of average hourly earnings show slightly different movements from
1939 to 1943.
For an explanation of apparent discrepancies between changes in average hourly
earnings in individual industries and in the broader groups of industries, see footnote
to Appendix Table 7.
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Per centto 54 per cent, for those producing nondurable goods 37 per cent.
This record is graphically portrayed in Chart 7. The margin between
the two members of each pair of bars is a measure of the change in
average hourly earnings.
Nonmanufacturing industries show wide variations also. in the
movements of employment, aggregate payrolls, and average hourly
earnings between 1939 and March 1943 (Table 13 and Chart 8).
Advances in hourly earnings range from 39 per cent in quarrying and
nonmetallic mining to 7 per cent for telephone and telegraph com•
panies.
These widely different degrees of change in employment, produc-
tion, and trade, in the average unit prices commanded by goods and
services, and in the aggregate values of these goods and services
reflect the varying physical needs of the war effort, extreme variations
from market to market in the intensity of demand and the elasticity
of supply, and differences in the effectiveness of inflationary controls.
The individual volume-value differentials on which attention has
TABLE 13
Nonmanufacturing Industries







Anthracite coal +33 +15 ±53
Bituminous coal +55 +30 +102
Metallilerous mining +24 +34 +66
Quarrying and nonmetallic mining +8 +39 +50
Petroleum producing —12 +22 +7
Publicutilities
Telephone and telegraph +28 +7 +37
Electric light and power —10 +18 +6
Street railways and busses +24 +22 +51
Trade
Wholesale —3 +28 +24
Retail —6 +23 +16
Retail, general merchandising +6 +21 +28
Services
Hotels, year-round 0 +30 +30
Laundries +20 +21 +45
Dyeing and cleaning +21 +24 +50
1 Figures on employment and payrolls are from compilations of the U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Measures of average hourly earnings are derived from employment and
payroll records.
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Per centbeen centered in the preceding discussion do not, of course, constitute
direct indexes of the intensity of a general force making for inflation.
What we have is the interplay of a host of particular factors, short-
ages of supplies here, insistent demands there; bargaining power that
is able to exploit a strategic advantage, or absence of such power;
immunity to price controls in one economic segment, effectiveness of
controls in another. Behind these specific factors there are circum-
stances and forces of wide import and effect—pressing national needs
in the war effort and an outpouring of funds that exceeds the increase
of productive power and of goods in the economy at large. But in their
actual impact these more general forces and deficiencies are reflected
in specific volume-value gaps. It is the totality of these varied and
uneven gaps that constitutes inflation.
We may learn something about the particular features of the most
recent inflationary rise by comparing certain of the volume and value
changes of this period with those of two earlier periods (Table 14
andChart 9). One covers 1914-19,wheninflationary advances were
TABLE 14
Changes in Quantities, Unit Prices,




Total production1quantity 100 110 100 174 100 162
price 100 211 100 99 100 133
value 100 232 100 172 100 215
Agriculture' quantity 100 106 100 119 100 120
price 100 211 100 117 100 171
value 100 224 100 139 100 205
Mining' quantity 100 115 100 175 100 122 100 114 119
price 100 176 100 96 100 111 100 113 115
value 100 202 100 168 100 135 100 129 137
quantity 100 119 100 188 100 176 100 194 200
price 100 211 100 92 100 124 100 124 125
value 100 251 100 173 100 218 100 241 250
Constructions quantity 100 69 100209 100 192 100 109 70
price 100 234 100 100 100 120 100 124 125
value 100 161 100 209 100 231 100 135 88
Employmentand
wages,mfg.°
totalemployment100 121 100 131 100 173 100 196201
average hourly
earnings 100 214 100 111 100 140 100 152 156
payrolls 100 259 100 146 100 242 100 298 314
Securities1 quantity 100438 100 658 100 108 134
price 100 124 100345 100 96 106
value, derived 100 543 1002,270 100 104 142
value,actual 100 73 97
*The periods compared are not expansion phases of business cycles.
1Quantityand unit price measurements are weighted averages of indexes of agriculture,
mining, manufacturing, and construction given in this table. The weights, averages of
39clear to all observers; the other covers 1921-29.Thelatter was a
period of notable economic expansion, but the price advances that
manifest inflation were restricted to certain areas of economic activity.
1927and1931 estimates of value added, are agriculture 22, mining 7, manufacturing
59, and construction 12. Value indexes are derived from quantity and unit price measures.
2Agriculturalproduction is estimated by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Unit
price is an average of farm prices. Value of agricultural production is derived from
quantity and price measurements.
8 production is estimated by Harold Barger and Sam Schurr for 1914-29; for
1939-43 use is made of indexes of mineral production computed by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The index of wholesale prices of raw miii-
erals is that of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Value indexes are derived
from quantity and price measures.
4Manufacturing production 1914-29 is estimated by Solomon Fabricant; for 1939-43
the production index of the Beard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is used.
The index of wholesale prices of manufactured goods is that of the National Bureau
of Economic Research. Value indexes are derived from quantity and price measures.
Bradstreet's value of contracts awarded is used for 1914-19; for 1921.43 indexes of
value of contracts awarded are computed by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System from data supplied by F. W. Dodge Corporation. Unit price represents
the index of construction costs computed by the American Appraisal Company. Volume
• of construction is derived from value and unit price measures.
0 employment,an index of man-hours worked in manufacturing industries
1914-29,iscomputed by Fabricant; for 1939-43indexesof number employed and hours
worked are those of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Payroll data for 1914-29 are from
the Census of Manufactures; for 1939-43 the Bureau of Labor Statistics index is used.
Average hourly earnings are derived from payroll and employment measures.
For19 14-19 the quantity index measures the number of shares sold on the N. Y. Stock
Exchange, excluding odd lots and stopped sales, as computed by the New York Timei.
The price index used for this period is the New York Times index of 50 stocks.
For 192 1-29 the quantity index measures the number of shares sold on the N.Y.
Stock Exchange, excluding odd lots and stopped sales, as computed by the New York
Times. The price index is the combined index of 402stockscomputed by Standard and
Poor's Corporation.
For 1939-43thequantity index measures the number of shares sold on the N. Y.
Stock Exchange, as compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The price
index is the average price of all listed shares on the N. Y. Stock Exchange, adjusted.for
stock split-ups, stock dividends, etc.
For each period the value series is derived from the price and quantity measure-
ments. The record of value changes, thus derived, is in some degree formal. It would
coincide with the actual change in the aggregate value of shares traded only if the
composition of the volume of shares traded were to remain unchanged. If there is a
shift in composition (such as would result from a swing to low-priced shares), the
quantity, price and value measures would not be mutually consistent. Such shifts un-
doubtedly occurred in all three of the periods here covered. For the final period actual
value figures are shown in italics below the derived measurements of value changes.
In this period there was a definite shift to low-priced shares; the actual value relative
is well below the derived figure. Although the derived value figures are formal, they
are given here as indications of the degree to which changes in the prices of securities


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The volume increases of 1914-19 were modest. Manufacturing
volume increased 19 per cent, the output of primary products by
smaller amounts. A combined index shows an advance of 10 per cent.
But the aggregate values of primary products and manufactured
goods were more than doubled. Inflationary forces advanced unit
prices to high levels. In the markets for securities 1919 brought a
very much larger volume of transactions, but unit prices for stocks
were only some 25 per cent higher than in 1914, as compared with
advances of 75 to 135 per cent for major commodity groups. Farm
realty values increased 36 per cent from 1914 to 1919, 65 per cent
from 1914 to 1920.24 These were substantial gains in a market nor-
mally sluggish. The advances in the labor market were greater. Manu-
facturing employment, measured in aggregate man-hours, was 21 per
cent greater in 1919 than in 1914; payrolls were 159 per cent higher.
Here, again, unit prices advanced: average hourly earnings of manu-
facturing labor were 114 per cent higher in 1919 than in 1914. It is
clear that the inflationary pressure of 1914-19 fell on commodities—
agricultural and mineral, raw and manufactured—and on the services
of labor.
Between 1921 and 1929 we turned out goods in a stream that
swelled with only minor interruptions. The production of commodi-
ties increased about 74 per cent, as against 10 per cent between 1914
and 1919. Yet the aggregate value of these goods increased only 72
per cent, materially less than the gain of 132 per cent in the earlier
period. The explanation, of course, is to be found in average unit
commodity prices, which declined slightly in the 'twenties, and rose
sharply from 1914 to 1919. We find a similar contrast in the labor
market. Total employment (aggregate man-hours worked) was 31
per cent greater in 1929 than in 1921. This exceeded the 1914-19
increase of 21 per cent. But payrolls increased only 46 per cent, as
against 159 per cent in the earlier period. The price of a unit of labor
(one man-hour) increased only 11 per cent from 1921 to 1929, as
against an increase of 114 per cent from 1914 to 1919. It was not in
commodity or in labor markets that the expanding purchasing power
of the 'twenties pressed upon supplies.25 Yet there was such pressure.
24 From estimates of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, on average value per acre
of farm real estate.
25 This statement, and the figures cited, do not tell the whole story of monetary move-
ments and commodity production between 1921 and 1929.There is some justification
for the view that inflationary forces affected commodity markets between 1921 and
1929, but that the inflation was concealed.Manufacturing productivity increased, greatLy
42It was manifest in two major areas in the 'twenties—urban real estate
values and the values of securities. For the first of these we have no
systematic measurements of comprehensive coverage.26 For securities,
as represented by common stocks, we have records that indicate the
dimensions of the expansion between 1921 and 1929. Trading in
1929, as measured by the number of shares sold, was six and one-half
times as great as in 1921; the aggregate value of shares sold increased
more than twenty-fold. Chart 9 gives an inadequate picture of this
gain, for the vertical scale has to be. broken if changes in other ele-
ments are to be appreciated. The index of average unit prices, the
direct measure of the volume-value differential, was 345 in 1929, as
compared with a base value of 100 in 1921.
The expanding force of purchasing power that could not be con-
strained within the limits of available physical quantities was felt
primarily in commodity and labor markets between 1914 and 1919,
and within these markets its influence was pervasive. In the 1920's
this force was not directly manifest in commodity markets (although
its presence was felt through the maintenance of prices that would
otherwise have been forced down by productivity advances). It broke
out with violence, however, in the markets for equity shares. Realty
values in special areas (e.g., Florida) were also affected. With these
two experiences of the fairly recent past we compare the records of
1939-43.
As we have seen, the pressures that generate volume-value differ-
entials were strongest, during the last four years, in the markets for
agricultural products and the services of labor. Commodities in gen-
eral felt the upward push of values, as they did not during the 'twen-
(output per man-hour went up about 43 per cent), but there was no corresponding
reduction of prices.(The average unit selling price of manufactured goods went down
about 8 per cent.The average cost per unit of product of the services of agents of
fabrication fell only 4 per cent.)In good part advancing fabricational costs and profits
absorbed the productivity gains, with results very similar to those brought about by
sharp advances in selling prices when there is no change in productivity.
26 Statistics on the assessed valuation of real property (land and improvements) throw
some light on changes in the value of real estate.The total value of such property in
the United States increased 62 per cent from the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922 to
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930 (from Financial Statistics of States, U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce). In some degree this increase represents new structures, but in the
main it reflects increased unit values, of existing property.This is a very considerable
advance, occurring during an eight-year period marked by a general decline in com-
modity prices.
The average value per acre of farm real estate declined about 25 per cent between
1921 and 1929.
43.ties, but the pressure, as judged by its consequences to date, was not
as 'strong as between 1914 and 1919, or as pervasive. The more
prompt and effective application of price controls in the markets for
raw minerals and for durable manufactured goods was, of course, an
important factor in this record. The recent movement has been selec-
tive inflation to a far greater degree than was the rise of 1914-19.
In the second place, the initial impact of the latest rise was felt in
commodity and labor markets and, to date, by far the greatest rise
has been in these markets. There has been no such upward push of
equity values as occurred in the 'twenties, nor was there a rise com-
parable to that of Within the last year and a half, how-
ever, these laggard markets have been stimulated. Common stocks
rose 53 per cent between April 1942 and June 1943. Average values
per acre of farm land rose only 1 per cent from 1939 to 1941 (March
1 values). From March 1, 1941 to March 1, 1942 there was an ad-
vance of 7 per cent. During the next twelve months, to March 1,
1943, the largest annual increase since 1920 occurred—9 per cent.28
The story of the latest economic expansion is, of course, unfinished.
How effective commodity price controls will be we do not know.
Whether the inflationary forces that are still clearly present and pow-
erful will be kept in check by rigorous taxation and more extensive
investment in government bonds and, if they are not, where and how
they will make themsel\'es felt as the expansion runs its course are
matters that are yet to be determined.
IIIPRICE RELATIONS IN 1943
The price shifts discussed in the preceding section have created a
system of price relations differing materially from those of 1939 and
those of 1914. The unit values of some goods and services have risen
tO new high levels; others have lagged, and have lost in relative
worth. These shifts affect the economic status of producing and con-
suming groups. The relations between physical outgo and physical
income are altered. The relative attractiveness of occupations is modi-
fied. Stimulus to productive activity is enhanced or retarded. The
relations now existing, after the stresses and upheavals of three and
27 Perhaps equally significant are the contrasts among the records of volume of trading
in the three periods.As compared with increases in number of shares sold of some 300
per cent in 1914-19, and 500 per cent in 1921-29, there was an advance of only 57
per cent between 1939 and March 1943.
28 Estimates of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.
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